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THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: 
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES THE 
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR NONCRIMINAL TRAFFIC 




The right to a jury trial is one of the most important of constitutional 
rights.  Practically speaking, exercising that right consumes both the time 
and resources of citizens and the judicial system.  It is well-established that 
an accused is not entitled to a jury trial when charged with a petty offense.  
Permitting a jury trial in petty offenses would bottleneck an already bur-
dened court calendar, and the cost-benefit relationship of a jury trial in petty 
offenses is untenable.  Accordingly, there are multiple offenses for which 
an accused is entitled to a hearing in front of a judicial officer, but not a 
hearing rising to the level of a jury trial.  For example, a citizen accused of 
violating highway speed limits is entitled to an administrative hearing for 
that violation, but is not entitled to a jury trial.  The right to a jury trial, 
therefore, involves a delicate balance between the nature of the right and the 
level of the offense.  A recent North Dakota Supreme Court decision 
directly affects that delicate balance.  This essay examines that decision. 
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“The law embodies the story of a nation’s development 
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained 
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.” 
 — Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am a prosecutor and thus am a courtroom lawyer.2  Courtroom law-
yers are keenly aware of the law of unintended consequences.3  We learn 
that the full impact of a court’s decision is rarely known immediately after 
the decision is made.  Although a court’s decision may have an immediate 
consequence—an intended consequence—upon each litigant, the decision’s 
full consequence—both intended and unintended—is only known after the 
court’s decision is tested and tried over a period of time by other courts. 
Surely all judges are well aware their decisions carry both intended and 
unintended consequences.  In fact, members of the North Dakota Supreme 
Court have explicitly acknowledged the concept at least four times in the 
past twenty years.4  In each of those four cases is an acknowledgement of 
the idea that unintended consequences are not desirable in the context of 
judicial economy and practicality because unintended consequences inject 
 
*Grand Forks County State’s Attorney, Grand Forks, North Dakota.  Adjunct Instructor of 
Law, University of North Dakota School of Law.  The author is a 1997 graduate, with distinction, 
of the University of North Dakota School of Law and has been the elected States Attorney for 
Grand Forks County, North Dakota, since 2002.  He thanks the editors and staff of the North 
Dakota Law Review, specifically Ben Williams, the Outside Articles Editor, who has been as 
patient and helpful to the author as any editor could possibly be.  This essay consists of the analy-
sis of only the author, who is solely responsible for any errors or omissions. 
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
2. Prosecutors, defense attorneys, civil litigators, magistrates, and judges are members of a 
group of lawyers who witness the functioning of a courtroom each workday.  For purposes of this 
essay, these lawyers are called courtroom lawyers. 
3. According to wordiq.com, “The Law of unintended consequences holds that almost all hu-
man actions have at least one unintended consequence.” Unintended Consequence, WORDIQ.COM, 
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Unintended_consequence (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).  “In 
other words, each cause has more than one effect including unforeseen effects.  The idea was orig-
inated by sociologist Robert K. Merton.” Id. 
4. Forum Commc’ns Co. v. Paulson, 2008 ND 140, ¶ 32, 752 N.W.2d 177, 187 
(VandeWalle, C.J., concurring) (“I write to note that our opinion may have unintended 
consequences.”); State v. Salveson, 2006 ND 169, ¶ 28, 719 N.W.2d 747, 757 (Maring, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he fact that an unintended consequence occurred does not support a finding that the 
defendant had two substantially different criminal objectives.”); Anderson v. N.D. Workers 
Comp. Bureau, 553 N.W.2d 496, 500 (N.D. 1996) (Neumann, J., concurring) (“Without adequate 
presentation to aid my ponderous thought processes, I fear the possibility of unintended 
consequences.”); Lapp v. Reeder Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 491 N.W.2d 65, 71 (N.D. 1992) (Levine, 
J., concurring) (“While our interpretation of these statutes may create law of unintended 
consequences, the legislature can overcome our mistaken view by amending the statutes to effect 
its intended consequences.”). 
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uncertainty into a court’s decision.5  Uncertainty fosters misunderstanding; 
misunderstanding fosters litigation.  Thus, unintended consequences can 
cause unnecessary litigation, which consumes a court’s limited time and 
resources. 
On May 11, 2010, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued a decision 
that illustrates the law of unintended consequences both for practicing attor-
neys and for taxpayers in the State of North Dakota.  In Riemers v. 
Eslinger,6 the court held the appellant, Roland Riemers, had a constitutional 
right to a jury trial for an alleged violation of a noncriminal municipal traf-
fic ordinance punishable by a twenty dollar fine.7  In short, the court held 
Riemers had a constitutional right to a jury trial for a petty offense.  This 
essay discusses the peculiar manner in which the Riemers case came before 
the North Dakota Supreme Court, the majority decision in the case, and the 
dissent.  Finally, there is a brief discussion of the possible consequences—
intended or unintended—of the decision in Riemers. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTS 
On July 22, 2009, Riemers was charged with following too closely to 
another vehicle, in violation of the Grand Forks City Code.8  For the 
offense, Riemers was subject to a twenty dollar fine.9  Because the offense 
was a noncriminal traffic offense, there was no possibility of incarcera-
tion.10  He pled not guilty to the offense in municipal court and requested a 
transfer to district court under North Dakota Century Code section 40-18-
15.1.11  The municipal judge, Henry Eslinger, denied the request, and 
Riemers responded by requesting a supervisory writ from the North Dakota 
Supreme Court.12  The court granted the petition with regard to whether 
Riemers had a constitutional right to a jury trial for a noncriminal municipal 
traffic citation punishable by a twenty dollar fine.13 
 
5. See cases cited supra note 4. 
6. 2010 ND 76, 781 N.W.2d 632. 
7. Riemers, ¶ 12, 781 N.W.2d at 635-36. 
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B. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Riemers took an uncommon path to the North Dakota Supreme Court.  
The case came before the court on a supervisory writ, petitioned for by 
Riemers.14  The court has discretionary authority to issue a supervisory writ, 
and a party to a case does not have a right to such a writ.15  Historically, the 
court has exercised its authority to issue supervisory writs rarely and 
cautiously and only to rectify errors and prevent injustice in extraordinary 
cases in which there is no adequate alternative remedy.16  Supervisory writs 
are considered extraordinary relief.17  The authority exists “so there might 
be some method by which the harmonious working of our judicial system 
could be insured, and to meet emergencies, and where other relief provided 
is inadequate or incomplete.”18 
Riemers represented himself.19  A self-represented appellant seeking a 
supervisory writ suggests a level of sophistication not often seen in self-
represented appellants; indeed, Riemers is not the typical self-represented 
appellant.  He has litigated before the North Dakota Supreme Court twenty-
five times in the past twelve years, and before the North Dakota Court of 
Appeals four times in that span.20  Of those twenty-nine cases, twenty-eight 
times he was either pro se or self-represented.21  Remarkably, as a non-
lawyer, he has been before the North Dakota Supreme Court more often 
 
14. Id. ¶ 1. 
15. Roe v. Rothe-Seeger, 2000 ND 63, ¶ 5, 608 N.W.2d 289, 291. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. State ex rel. Red River Brick Corp. v. Dist. Court, 138 N.W. 988, 989 (N.D. 1912). 
19. Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, 781 N.W.2d 632 (syllabus). 
20. See generally, e.g., City of Grand Forks v. Riemers, No. 20100107, 2010 WL 5416843 
(N.D. Dec. 21, 2010); Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, 781 N.W.2d 632; State ex rel. Dep’t of 
Labor v. Riemers, 2010 ND 43, 779 N.W.2d 649; Riemers v. State, 2009 ND 115, 767 N.W.2d 
832; State ex rel. Dep’t of Labor v. Riemers, 2008 ND 191, 757 N.W.2d 50; City of Grand Forks 
v. Riemers, 2008 ND 153, 755 N.W.2d 99; Riemers v. State, 2008 ND 118, 756 N.W.2d 344; 
Riemers v. State, 2008 ND 101, 750 N.W.2d 407; Riemers v. Mahar, 2008 ND 95, 748 N.W.2d 
714; Riemers v. State, 2007 ND APP 4, 739 N.W.2d 248; Riemers v. State, 2007 ND APP 3, 738 
N.W.2d 906; Riemers v. State, 2007 ND APP 2, 732 N.W.2d 398; Riemers v. State, 2007 ND 
APP 1, 731 N.W.2d 620; Riemers v. City of Grand Forks, 2006 ND 224, 723 N.W.2d 518; 
Riemers v. State, 2006 ND 162, 718 N.W.2d 566; Riemers v. Grand Forks Herald, 2004 ND 192, 
688 N.W.2d 167; Riemers v. Omdahl, 2004 ND 188, 687 N.W.2d 445; Riemers v. Peters-
Riemers, 2004 ND 153, 684 N.W.2d 619; Riemers v. Anderson, 2004 ND 109, 680 N.W.2d 280; 
Riemers v. O’Halloran, 2004 ND 79, 678 N.W.2d 547; Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2004 ND 28, 
674 N.W.2d 287; Lamb v. Riemers, 2003 ND 148, 669 N.W.2d 113; Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 
2003 ND 96, 663 N.W.2d 657; Flattum-Riemers v. Flattum-Riemers, 2003 ND 70, 660 N.W.2d 
558; Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2002 ND 72, 644 N.W.2d 197; Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2002 
ND 49, 641 N.W.2d 83; Flattum-Riemers v. Peters-Riemers, 2001 ND 121, 630 N.W.2d 71; 
Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2001 ND 62, 623 N.W.2d 83; Flattum-Riemers v. Flattum-Riemers, 
1999 ND 146, 598 N.W.2d 499. 
21. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  Riemers was represented by counsel in 
Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2003 ND 96, 663 N.W.2d 657. 
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than most practicing North Dakota attorneys during the same time frame.  
In fact, in petitioning for the supervisory writ, it appears Riemers was 
simply following the direction that had been given to him by the court two 
years earlier in a separate, but similar, case.22 
In City of Grand Forks v. Riemers,23 Riemers was charged with a 
noncriminal traffic offense and appeared in Grand Forks Municipal Court.24  
He filed a list of objections, including a demand for a jury trial.25  The jury 
trial was denied, the matter was tried to the municipal court bench, and 
Riemers was found guilty.26  Riemers then appealed the matter to district 
court, requesting a trial de novo and a jury trial.27  The district court denied 
his request for a jury trial, and instead the district court bench tried the 
matter.28  Riemers was again found guilty.29  He then appealed the matter to 
the North Dakota Supreme Court, alleging he had the right to a jury trial in 
the underlying offense.30 
The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed Riemers’ appeal, holding 
the court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.31  However, in dismissing 
the appeal, Justice Kapsner, who also authored the Riemers v. Eslinger 
opinion, wrote: 
Although we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Riemers’ 
attempted appeal, we note that an appropriate procedure was avail-
able for him to challenge the denial of a jury trial.  If Riemers be-
lieved he had a right to a jury trial on the charged offense, he 
should have immediately sought a transfer of the matter from the 
municipal court to the district court . . . .  If Riemers had filed a 
timely request to transfer the matter to district court under 
N.D.C.C. § 40-18-15.1, and the municipal court had denied the 
transfer or the district court, after transfer, had denied Riemers’ 
request for a jury trial, Riemers could then have sought a super-
visory writ from this Court.  This would have been the appropriate 
procedure to seek this Court’s review of whether a defendant has a 
right to a jury trial in a noncriminal traffic case.32 
 
22. See City of Grand Forks v. Riemers, 2008 ND 153, ¶ 8, 755 N.W.2d 99, 101-02. 
23. 2008 ND 153, 755 N.W.2d 99. 
24. Riemers, ¶ 2. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 




31. Id. ¶ 1. 
32. Id. ¶ 8, 755 N.W.2d at 101-02 (emphasis added). 
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Riemers followed the course of action suggested by the court in City of 
Grand Forks v. Riemers and found himself before the North Dakota 
Supreme Court again in Riemers v. Eslinger. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The majority opinion in Riemers was authored by Justice Kapsner.33  
Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice Crothers joined in the majority 
opinion.34  The majority first explained municipal court jurisdiction and 
procedure, and then considered the nature of the right to a jury trial in North 
Dakota.35 
1. Explanation of Municipal Court Jurisdiction and Procedure 
Early in its opinion, the court explained both the jurisdiction of munici-
pal courts and the procedure for trials in municipal court.36  As far as juris-
diction is concerned, municipal judges have the authority to preside over B 
misdemeanors and infractions.37  They also have authority over cases 
involving a violation of a city ordinance.38  However, the procedure for 
contesting a citation for a violation of a municipal ordinance depends upon 
the nature of the citation.39 
Procedurally, if the right to a jury trial does not otherwise exist, the 
municipal judge may try municipal ordinance citations without a jury.40  
However, there are both noncriminal municipal ordinances, and there are 
criminal municipal ordinances.41  If the violation is of a criminal ordinance, 
then the right to a jury trial exists, and the defendant enforces that right by 
making a written request to transfer the case from municipal court to district 
court.42 
If the defendant in the municipal court proceeding has the right to a 
jury trial and does not waive that right, then the jury trial is conducted by 
 
33. Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, ¶ 1, 781 N.W.2d 632, 632. 
34. Id. ¶ 28, 781 N.W.2d at 641. 
35. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8, 781 N.W.2d at 633-34. 
36. Id. ¶ 4, 781 N.W.2d at 633. 
37. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-15(2) (2006) (conferring authority upon municipal judges 
to “[h]ear, try and determine misdemeanors and infractions when jurisdiction has been conferred 
by the Constitution of North Dakota and this and other laws”). 
38. Riemers, ¶ 4, 781 N.W.2d at 633. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. ¶ 5. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (noting the 1973 legislature eliminated the ability of municipal courts to conduct jury 
trials). 
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the district court.43  Additionally, should the defendant appeal the decision 
of the district court, the appeal of that decision is to the North Dakota 
Supreme Court.44  Conversely, if the defendant is willing to waive the right 
to a jury trial, then the municipal judge may try the case without a jury—in 
other words, a “bench trial.”45  If there is a bench trial in municipal court, 
the defendant has the right to appeal the decision of the municipal judge.46  
The appeal is made directly to the district court “for trial anew,” pursuant to 
North Dakota Century Code section 40-18-19.47  However, a waiver of the 
right to a jury trial in municipal court also constitutes a waiver in district 
court.48  Accordingly, if the defendant has waived his or her right to a jury 
trial, then the “trial anew” in the appeal is a bench trial to the district 
judge.49 
By North Dakota statute, a defendant has the right to a jury trial in all 
criminal prosecutions.50  However, virtually all traffic offenses are deemed 
“noncriminal.”51  Therefore, although all defendants charged with a non-
criminal traffic offense have the right to a hearing on the offense, that 
hearing is limited to a hearing in front of the municipal judge, without the 
right to the presence of a jury.52  The appeal of the decision would be to the 
district court, again without the right to the presence of a jury.53  Such was 
the case with the original violation in Riemers.54 
2. The Nature of the Right to a Jury Trial 
The Riemers court acknowledged the import of the case before it, 
stating, “The brief and relatively simple history of this case masks the sig-
nificant questions it raises regarding the right of trial by jury in our state, 
which we long ago described as ‘the most important of constitutional 
rights.’”55  Emphasizing the nature of the right to a jury trial, the court drew 
attention to the precept that, constitutionally, the right to a jury trial is to be 
secured to all and to “remain inviolate.”56  The court further emphasized 
 
43. Id. 
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-03 (2009). 
45. Id. § 40-18-15. 




50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-06(5). 
51. Id. § 39-06.1-02. 
52. Riemers, ¶ 7, 781 N.W.2d at 634. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. ¶ 3, 781 N.W.2d at 633. 
56. Id. ¶ 8, 781 N.W.2d at 634. 
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that none of the substantial elements of the right to a jury trial may be 
eliminated by legislation or judicial construction.57 
The court took particular care in the manner in which it framed the 
issue in Riemers.  It noted: 
“[T]he framers of the Constitution intended by the adoption of said 
provision to preserve and perpetuate the right of trial by jury as it 
existed by law at and prior to the adoption of the Constitution.” . . . 
As a result, “the right of trial by jury which is secured by the 
Constitution is the right of trial by jury with which the people who 
adopted it were familiar . . . as defined by the statutes which 
existed prior to and at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion.” . . . .  Therefore, in interpreting the application of art. I, § 13 
to violations of municipal ordinances, we examine the right of trial 
by jury as of 1889, the year our state adopted its constitution.58 
Central to the analysis of both the majority and the dissent in Riemers was 
section 937 from the Compiled Laws of the Territory of Dakota (C.L. 
§ 937).59  The statute was last modified in 1887, two years before the 
Territory of Dakota was separated into the States of North Dakota and 
South Dakota.60  However, because the Riemers court was attempting to 
apply the right to a jury trial, “which existed prior to and at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution,” the statute became a central focus of the 
opinion rendered by the court.61 
C.L. § 937 provided the right of trial by jury in specific situations: 
Cases before the city justice arising under the city ordinances shall 
be tried and determined by the justice without the intervention of a 
jury except in cases where under the provisions of the ordinances 
of the city imprisonment for a longer period than ten days is made 
a part of the penalty, or the maximum fine shall be twenty dollars 
or over, and the defendant shall demand a trial by jury before the 
commencement of such trial . . . .62 
Because Riemers was facing a twenty dollar fine and the right to a jury trial 
existed in 1889 for alleged violations involving a punishment of ten or more 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 781 N.W.2d at 634-35 (citations omitted). 
59. Id. ¶¶ 10, 31, 781 N.W.2d at 635, 642. 
60. Id. ¶ 10, 781 N.W.2d at 635. 
61. Id. ¶ 9, 781 N.W.2d at 634. 
62. C.L. § 937 (1887). 
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days in jail or a twenty dollar fine, the majority held Riemers was entitled to 
a jury trial under the Constitution of the State of North Dakota.63 
The analysis of the majority focused upon the nature of the right to a 
jury trial.64  Acknowledging the Territorial Legislature replaced city justices 
with police justices seven months before the adoption of the state constitu-
tion,65 the majority noted the Territorial Legislature did not alter the right of 
trial by jury itself, but rather just the official to whom the case would be 
tried.66  Additionally, the right to appeal the adverse decision at the time 
remained with the district court, similar to the right of appeal under present 
North Dakota law.67  To the majority, this analysis was consistent with the 
desire of the framers that the nature of the right to a jury trial shall remain 
inviolate.68 
The City of Grand Forks argued Riemers was analogous to State v. 
Brown,69 a recent North Dakota case addressing the right to a jury trial for a 
defendant charged with violating a Cass County animal control ordinance.70  
In Brown, the defendant was cited for violating an ordinance authorizing no 
possible imprisonment and fined fifty dollars.71  Brown argued the North 
Dakota Constitution afforded her the right to a trial by jury because the 
right to a jury trial applied to violations of ordinances authorizing a fine of 
twenty dollars or more.72 
The majority in Brown held the defendant did not have the right to a 
jury trial because the violation of the ordinance was a criminal infraction, 
an offense not recognized at the time the state constitution was adopted.73  
The Brown court stated the legislature meant for infractions to be “an 
entirely new category of lesser criminal offenses with its own unique proce-
dural requirements.”74  Accordingly, in Brown, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court held “a person charged with violating an infraction-level offense, 
including a county ordinance creating an infraction-level offense, which 
carries no possibility of imprisonment, is not entitled to a jury trial under 
N.D. Const. art. I, § 13.”75 
 
63. Riemers, ¶ 12, 781 N.W.2d at 635. 
64. Id. 




69. 2009 ND 150, 771 N.W.2d 267. 
70. Brown, ¶ 44, 771 N.W.2d at 279. 
71. Id. ¶ 46, 771 N.W.2d at 280. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. ¶¶ 49-50, 771 N.W.2d at 281. 
74. Id. ¶ 50. 
75. Id. ¶ 52, 771 N.W.2d at 282. 
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The City of Grand Forks attempted to analogize Riemers to Brown.  As 
in Brown, where infractions were developed after the adoption of the 
Constitution, the City argued that territorial law similarly did not compre-
hensively regulate traffic prior to the adoption of the state Constitution.76  
This would seem to be a reasonable argument, given the automobile had not 
yet taken the nation by storm in 1889, the year of North Dakota’s statehood; 
however, the court was unpersuaded.77 
In disposing of the City’s argument that Riemers was analogous to 
Brown, the majority opined “the City misstates the nature of traffic regula-
tions at the time the state constitution was adopted.”78  The Compiled Laws 
of 1887, in fact, gave cities the authority to regulate traffic upon the streets 
and to regulate the speed of horses and other animals and vehicles within 
city limits.79  The court indicated the City of Grand Forks had adopted 
traffic ordinances as early as 1887 and had even authorized fines of five to 
twenty-five dollars for violations.80  The court declined to apply the rea-
soning of Brown to Riemers, in part because as early as 1887, the City had 
the right to regulate traffic in the streets, and at that time, the fines imposed 
for violating traffic ordinances were high enough to trigger the right to a 
jury trial under territorial law.81 
The majority also disposed of another argument posited by the City of 
Grand Forks that is crucial to delineating the nature of the right to a jury 
trial.  It is well-established the right to trial by jury under the United States 
Constitution does not apply to “petty” offenses.82  In determining whether 
an offense is petty or serious, courts focus on the maximum prison term 
authorized for committing the offense.83  According to the United States 
Supreme Court, if a prison term of less than six months is attached to an 
offense, courts presume the offense to be petty.84  The offense with which 
Riemers was charged was punishable by a twenty dollar fine and no 
incarceration.85 
 
76. Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, ¶ 13, 781 N.W.2d 632, 636. 
77. Id. ¶ 16, 781 N.W.2d at 637. 
78. Id. ¶ 14. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. ¶ 15 (describing an 1887 Grand Forks city ordinance that prohibited persons from 
driving “any wagon, carriage, dray, cart, or other vehicle” at a speed greater than six miles an 
hour). 
81. Id. ¶ 16. 
82. Id. ¶ 17, 781 N.W.2d at 637-38. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. ¶ 18, 781 N.W.2d at 638. 
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The majority acknowledged Riemers was faced with a petty offense.86  
However, the court stated its decision would not be affected by this fact 
because “we may provide the citizens of our state, as a matter of state 
constitutional law, greater protection than the safeguards guaranteed in the 
Federal Constitution.”87  The court gave no rationale, nor was it required to, 
for affording this greater protection to the citizens of North Dakota.88 
In concluding its opinion, the Riemers majority distinguished its 
analysis from the treatment given to the same issue by the South Dakota 
Supreme Court.89  The majority noted both North Dakota and South Dakota 
were admitted into the United States on November 2, 1889, and that both 
states were governed at that time by the Compiled Laws of the Territory of 
Dakota.90  The court noted the right to a jury trial in both states “should 
theoretically be the same.”91  In fact, when faced with the same issue as the 
Riemers court, the South Dakota Supreme Court initially held its Constitu-
tion preserved the right to a jury trial in cases like Riemers.92  The Riemers 
court noted, however, that South Dakota’s initial interpretation of this right 
was only temporary.93 
In State v. Wikle,94 the South Dakota Supreme Court overruled its 
earlier decision in City of Brookings v. Roberts,95 holding there was no 
constitutional right in South Dakota to a jury trial for violations of munici-
pal ordinances where the ordinance authorized imprisonment for ten or 
more days or a fine of twenty or more dollars.96  The Wikle court focused 
upon the concurring opinions in Roberts as accurately describing the consti-
tutional right to a jury trial in South Dakota.97  Citing the concurrence’s 
requirement of a possible jail sentence as one line of demarcation in deter-
mining the right to a jury trial, the Wikle court also noted it “could not give 
[a] literal endorsement to an 1887 law that referred to $20 as the demarca-
tion line for jury trials.”98  The Wikle court stated, “The rule of law that 
incorporated existing statutory law into our state constitution upon its 
 
86. Id. (“Therefore, the City is likely correct that Riemers does not have a right to a jury trial 
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adoption should be followed in matters of legal principle, but it becomes 
absurd when followed literally in regard to monetary amounts.”99 
The Riemers majority, however, was “unpersuaded” by the reasoning 
of the South Dakota Supreme Court in Wikle.100  Maintaining the South 
Dakota Supreme Court did not analyze the nature of the right under territo-
rial law in 1889, the Riemers court was also troubled with which principle 
to apply to the twenty dollar limit.101  If not the literal twenty dollar limit, 
asked the court, then what principle should apply if the value of the dollar 
varies?102  The court asked how it should determine the right to a jury trial 
if the right were to fluctuate with inflation.  The majority closed its opinion: 
We hold to our prior jurisprudence, that the right of trial by jury is 
determined by the laws as they existed at the time the Constitution 
of North Dakota was adopted, and decline to follow the South 
Dakota Supreme Court.  The people of North Dakota may change 
this right if they choose.103 
B. THE DISSENT 
Justice Sandstrom wrote the dissenting opinion in Riemers, joined by 
Justice Maring.104  The dissent began with the acknowledgment that the 
Constitution of North Dakota preserves the right to a jury trial in cases for 
which the right existed at statehood.105  Citing C.L. § 937, the same territo-
rial statute relied upon by the majority, but with a different analysis of what 
constitutes a petty offense, Justice Sandstrom opined: 
At statehood, the law of Dakota Territory, which became the law 
of North Dakota, provided for a jury trial for serious, “non-petty,” 
violations of municipal ordinances.  On the basis of this interpre-
tation, which is consistent with the interpretation of the United 
States Supreme Court and other courts as discussed below, 
Riemers is not entitled to a jury trial.106 
Calling the majority’s interpretation “unreasonable and inconsis-
tent,”107 Justice Sandstrom took issue with the majority’s analysis of and 
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reliance upon C.L. § 937.108  His inference was that there are two ways to 
analyze C.L. § 937.109  It can be analyzed in a literal sense, or it can be 
analyzed using modern equivalents.110 
On one hand, a literal reading of C.L. § 937 provides for a bench trial 
unless the “maximum fine shall be twenty dollars or over.”111  The majority 
relied upon a literal interpretation of this language in justifying its holding 
that the Constitution of North Dakota provided Riemers with the right to a 
jury trial for a noncriminal municipal traffic citation punishable by a twenty 
dollar fine.112  But, Justice Sandstrom noted a consistent literal reading of 
the statute applies only to “cases before the city justice.”113  Accordingly, 
because the office of city justice had been legislatively abolished, Justice 
Sandstrom pointed out a literal interpretation of the entire statute—and not 
just one segment of the statute—would result in a logical conclusion that 
Riemers did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial because city 
justices no longer exist under North Dakota law.114 
Justice Sandstrom illustrated a consistent “modern equivalent” analysis 
of C.L. § 937 would also result in determining Riemers did not have the 
constitutional right to a jury trial.115  Assuming the modern equivalent of a 
city justice would be a municipal judge, Justice Sandstrom noted the mod-
ern equivalent of twenty dollars in 1887 would be approximately four hun-
dred dollars.116  Thus, consistently analyzing C.L. § 937 as a whole using 
modern equivalents would result in Riemers not having the right to a jury 
trial.  Justice Sandstrom then followed his analysis to its logical conclusion 
in illustrating the inconsistent logic used by the majority in analyzing C.L. 
§ 937:  “Only by applying one rule (modern equivalent) to the first half of 
the sentence and the other rule (literal language) to the second half of the 
sentence does the majority reach its conclusion.”117 
Justice Sandstrom also illustrated how the majority’s analysis in 
Riemers was inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the United States 
Supreme Court regarding the right to a jury trial.118  In a line of cases 
extending over 120 years, the United States Supreme Court has held the 
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right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions applies only to serious crimes, 
not petty offenses.119  Furthermore, although the United States “Supreme 
Court has declined to establish a precise line of demarcation for petty 
offenses,” it has indicated a crime is not petty when there is a possibility of 
incarceration for six months or more.120  Given the fact that Riemers faced a 
penalty of twenty dollars with no possibility of any incarceration, it would 
have been well within the parameters of United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence to hold Riemers’ offense was petty and thus carried with it no 
right to a jury trial. 
Justice Sandstrom further elaborated on the analysis of the South 
Dakota Supreme Court in both Roberts and Wikle.121  Reiterating the 
court’s statements in Roberts that it “could not give literal endorsement to 
an 1887 law that referred to $20 as the demarcation line for jury trials,” 
Justice Sandstrom also noted the South Dakota Supreme Court has since 
extended its opinion in Wikle.122  Specifically, in State v. Auen,123 the South 
Dakota Supreme Court held in prosecutions of offenses with maximum 
authorized jail sentences of less than six months, a court may deny a jury 
trial request if the court assures the defendant that no jail sentence will be 
imposed.124 
IV. CONCLUSION:  WHERE DOES NORTH DAKOTA GO 
FROM HERE? 
From a courtroom lawyer’s perspective, and from a taxpayer’s per-
spective, it is difficult to accept that the law of North Dakota now provides 
for a jury trial in cases involving no possibility of jail and a fine of twenty 
dollars.  In February 2011, six jurors made history as the first North Dakota 
jurors to hear a parking ticket case.125  Not all the jurors felt the time was 
well spent; “I think public servants and citizens have a lot better use of time 
than to be giving consideration over what I understood to be a $20 ticket,” 
said jury foreman Mark Jones.126  Ironically—or perhaps not—the defen-
dant in the case was none other than Roland Riemers.127  The court admin-
istrator estimated the cost of the jury alone to be approximately $780, not 
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counting the time invested by the judge, court clerk, and court reporter.  
Even without any possible appeal, it is difficult to rationalize—at least in a 
purely economic sense—the cost of collecting the twenty dollar fine in such 
a case.  That cost would, inarguably, be dramatically reduced if the right to 
a jury trial did not attach to such an offense. 
Should the North Dakota Supreme Court not overrule Riemers in a 
future case, the court indicated the people of North Dakota could change 
this newfound right if they should so choose.128  The court was likely 
referring to a constitutional measure clarifying the right to a jury trial in the 
State of North Dakota.  Another option would be legislative action, al-
though there is none of any kind pending during the current legislative 
session.  Regardless, the right to a jury trial for a petty offense is the law of 
the land in North Dakota.  It remains to be seen what additional conse-
quences—intended or unintended—accompany that right. 
 
128. Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, ¶ 26, 781 N.W.2d 632, 641. 
